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Open Questions in Pennsylvania Criminal Law
Samuel J. Reich*
Jay H. Spiegel**
This article developed from a research assignment for students in
the Criminal Defense Clinic of Duquesne Unitersity School of Law.'
The issues treated herein do not exhaust the list of questions yet to
be resolved by our courts; our attempt is to emphasize issues of
importance to trial attorneys-both prosecution and defense.
The article was written in admiration of the courts that not only
address open questions, but articulate cogent decisions. Our admi-
ration is not restricted to justices and judges who appear to press
for decisions favorable to the defense, because it is a mistake to
dwell on whether a decision appears to favor the prosecution or
defense-such appearances are often inaccurate. Those who dwell
on mere results may miss the wisdom of the rationale or, and maybe
more essential, the nature of the problem itself.
We proceed on a fundamental proposition: appellate courts
should not only decide cases, but should announce principles to
guide future proceedings. Presently in Pennsylvania, the appellate
courts-supreme and superior-are closely divided on many impor-
tant criminal issues. This article reviews the development and sta-
tus of Pennsylvania law on nine of those issues.
* Partner, Gefsky, Reich & Reich; University of Pittsburgh, B.A. (1957); University of
Pennsylvania School of Law, LL.B. (1960); Assistant United States Attorney, Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania (1961-1966); First Assistant United States Attorney (1964-1966); Chair-
man, Association of Trial Lawyers in the Criminal Courts of Allegheny County; Adjunct
Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law (1974 to present) teaching Professional
Responsibility and the Criminal Defense Clinic.
** Associate, Gefsky, Reich & Reich; University of Pittsburgh, B.A., B.S. (1973); Du-
quesne University School of Law, J.D. (1977); Assistant Instructor, Duquesne University
School of Law (1977-1978), Criminal Defense Clinic.
1. The Clinic involves students in actual trials. An experienced attorney receives appoint-
ments in indigent cases and two to three students are assigned to assist the attorney. The
attorney is responsible for the actual conduct of the proceedings. The students are present
during court and participate extensively in the drafting of documents and all trial prepara-
tion. Weekly panel discussions on selected topics by attorneys, judges, and others involved
in the administration of criminal justice broaden the student's knowledge of the criminal
court system.
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LINE-UPS AND THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL2
The United States Supreme Court has held that the defendant's
appearance in a line-up at a "critical stage of prosecution" triggers
the defendant's right to counsel.' There is confusion, however, as to
what constitutes a critical stage of the prosecution. For example, in
Kirby v. Illinois,I the Court decided that there is no right to counsel
before prosecution commences. The Court, however, did not decide
exactly when prosecution begins, since the Kirby line-up took place
before indictment or formal charges. In Commonwealth v.
Richman,5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a more protec-
tive rule: the defendant is entitled to counsel at a line-up anytime
after he is arrested.
There is generally little confusion as to when the line-up is occur-
ring: whenever a victim or witness attempts to identify the suspect
among a group which includes the suspect and several nonsuspects.
Other confrontations between a witness and the defendant, how-
ever, have been found to trigger a right to counsel. In
Commonwealth v. Taylor,6 potential witnesses were seated at the
back of the courtroom just before the defendant was given a prelimi-
nary hearing. Six or seven other persons who were scheduled for
hearings were brought in and, as each entered, the witnesses were
asked if they could identify the person as the offender in their case.
The defendant, Taylor, was identified by the witnesses. Although
the defendant was represented by counsel, his attorney was not
informed that an identification procedure was in process. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held this to be line-up, requiring the assis-
tance of counsel. Since counsel was unaware of the identification
proceedings, his presence was immaterial.7
As they have expanded the concept of what constitutes a line-up,
the Pennsylvania courts have also moved beyond any notion of only
formal arrest as constituting an arrest triggering the right to counsel
at line-up. An arrest is accomplished by any act indicating an intent
2. Research assistance was provided by Kirk Holman.
3. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
4. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
5. 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974).
6. 472 Pa. 1, 370 A.2d 1197 (1977).
7. Under circumstances very similar to Taylor, the United States Supreme Court held
that, for federal constitutional purposes, the right to counsel attaches at a preliminary hear-
ing. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977).
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to take a person into custody and to subject him to the actual
control and will of the officer.' Pennsylvania cases thus defining
arrest, when coupled with Richman, appear to bar all confrontations
between the victim or witness and'the defendant without counsel,
while the defendant is held in custody. However, Commonwealth v.
Ray, I decided prior to Richman, held to the contrary. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that a defendant has no right to counsel
while being "detained" for investigation shortly after the commis-
sion of a crime, even though potential witnesses were asked to iden-
tify him at the detention site. Since the status of limited detention,
as contrasted with arrest, is itself an open question in Pennsylvania
(Ray was decided by a closely-divided court), the exception may not
survive the Richman decision. There are obvious advantages to law
enforcers and potential advantages to defendants if the police have
some leeway to allow witnesses to view the suspect at or near the
scene of the crime shortly after the time of commission; such a "line-
up" may avoid an unnecessary arrest for the defendant. However,
if Richman qpplies to all such identifications, the cumbersome
mechnaics of obtaining counsel may make a viewing shortly after
the arrest an impossibility.
In Richman, no justice questioned the need for counsel at a line-
up that occurred some four-and-one-half hours after arrest. Since
there was no majority opinion, the opinion of each justice is crucial.
Justices Pomeroy and Eagen, in separate opinions, indicated they
would not require counsel for confrontations taking place within a
short time after the crime is committed or for immediate on-the-
scene identifications.
Nevertheless, identification shortly after the crime poses the same
reliability problems that led the courts to require assistance of coun-
sel in confrontations occurring after arrest. If counsel is required at
any identification, counsel should arguably be required at all identi-
fications. It remains to be seen what is meant by a "short period of
time" after the commission of the crime or "immediate on-the-scene
identifications" and whether these definitions will become impor-
tant open questions.
8. Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963); Commonwealth v. Sharpe,
449 Pa. 35, 296 A.2d 519 (1972).
9. 455 Pa. 45, 315 A.2d 634 (1973).
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PROBABLE CAUSE-INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FIRST-TIME
INFORMANTSO
In Pennsylvania, the authorities have had difficulties in obtaining
valid warrants based on information supplied by first time inform-
ants. For example, in Commonwealth v. Slater," a search warrant
was issued on the basis of information provided by an unpaid in-
formant who had not given information in the past. Even though the
informant gave a sworn statement to the police, the warrant was
struck down, and the superior court affirmed the decision of the
lower court suppressing the evidence.' 2
The Constitutional Background
Searches, with or without a warrant, must be based upon proba-
ble cause. Where a search warrant has been issued, the probable
cause must be stated in a supporting affidavit. The affidavit must
satisfy the test established by the' United States Supreme Court in
Aguilar v. Texas: 2 is there sufficient information from which a neu-
tral and detached magistrate can find probable cause? If all or part
of the information has been furnished by an informant, the inform-
ant's information must satisfy the Supreme Court requirements as
established in Aguilar and also the requirements of Spinelli v.
United States'3 that the circumstances concerning the informant's
credibility or the source of his information be disclosed, or that the
informant's tip be corroborated. Aguilar and Spinelli have been
interpreted by the Pennsylvania courts to require the affidavit to
demonstrate that: 1) the informant is a reliable source of informa-
tion; and 2) the informant had a reliable basis for this information.'4
In other words, the magistrate must have information demonstra-
ting the past reliability of the informant and how the informant's
information was obtained.
With first time informants, the first prong of the test poses unique
problems. In Commonwealth v. Falk,5 the superior court estab-
10. Research assistance was provided by Jolene Grubb.
11. 242 Pa. Super Ct. 255, 375 A.2d 1257 (1976).
12. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
13. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
14. Commonwealth v. Samuels, 235 Pa' Super Ct. 192, 340 A.2d 880 (1975); Common-
wealth v. Wright, 212 Pa. Super. Ct. 259, 243 A.2d 213 (1968). See also Commonwealth v.
Cummings, 416 Pa. 510, 207 A.2d 230 (1965).
15. 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 243, 290 A.2d 125 (1972).
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lished a four factor standard derived from the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Harris v. United States"5 to be applied in
determining the reliability or trustworthiness of an informant: 1)
accurate information previously given; 2) corroboration of the in-
formant's story by other sources; 3) personal and recent observa-
tions of the informant which result in a declaration against his
interest; and 4) the reputation of the defendant with the police, if
supported by prior evidence within the affiant's own knowledge.
Certainly, these factors provided sufficient guidance in the typi-
cal case. Strictly applied, however, the Aguilar/Spinelli standard
would make it difficult to establish probable cause on the basis of a
first-time informant. It should be noted that the federal cases-
Aguilar, Spinelli, and Harris-did not intend these four factors to
be the exclusive test of reliability and a close reading of Harris
indicates that the United States Supreme Court favors a flexible
balancing analysis of the particular facts of each case. 7
Possible Solutions
In cases involving a first time informant the police might attempt
to establish reliability by taking the informant to a magistrate and
having him testify under oath. Where the witness has been sworn
and the magistrate has an opportunity to observe, hear, and evalu-
ate the witness, there should be no need for the substantiation that
Aguilar/Spinelli and Harris require."8 It appears, however, that the
police did this in Commonwealth v. Haberman" and still the affida-
vit was rejected at the trial level.
The issue of an informant's reliability becomes a particular prob-
lem where the police have made a warrantless search or where a
warrant has been obtained on the basis of information provided by
an unnamed confidential source. Clearly, protections are necessary
to prevent unconstitutional intrusions based on information pro-
vided by nameless, faceless sources. Nevertheless, it is doubtful
whether the United States Supreme Court would apply the
Aguilar/Spinelli requirements to information provided by an eye-
16. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
17. Id. at 584-85.
18. It should be noted that first time witnesses frequently testify in court and such testi-
mony can provide the basis for conviction.
19. Commonwealth v. Haberman is presently pending before the Pennsylvania Superior
Court.
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witness, bystander, or victim. In United States v. Bel, 20 an eye-
witness to a bank robbery gave information which was used to estab-
lish probable cause for a search warrant. The Fifth Circuit said:
We have discovered no case that extends [the Spinelli] re-
quirement to the identified bystander or victim-eyewitness to
a crime, and we now hold that so such requirement need be met
.... Such observers are seldom involved with the miscreants
or the crime. Eyewitnesses by definition are not passing along
idle rumor, for they either have been the victims of the crime
or have otherwise seen some portion of it. A "neutral and de-
tached magistrate" could adequately assess the probative
value of an eyewitnesses's information because, if it is reasona-
ble and accepted as true, the magistrate must believe that it
is based upon first-hand knowledge. Thus we conclude that
Aguilar and Spinelli requirements are limited to the informant
situation only."1
Various state and federal decisions have followed Bell and elimi-
nated the necessity of specific allegations of credibility-credibility
is inferred from their status as an eyewitness or victim.22 Harris also
suggests another approach: if a wealth of detail is provided under
one prong of the Aguilar/Spinelli test, it should be permitted to spill
over to bolster the other. 23
Thus, it appears that the Pennsylvania Superior Court is apply-
ing the federal constitutional standards more rigidly than the fed-
eral courts. Assuming the importance of informants, particularly
the citizen-volunteer, the Aguilar/Spinelli requirements should not
be interpreted to exclude such sources if there are other sufficient
indicia of reliability.
20. 457 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1972).
21. Id. at 1238-39.
22. ' United States v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191, 1204 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Burke,
517 F.2d 377, 380 (2d Cir. 1975); Cundiff v. United States, 501 F.2d 188, 189-90 (8th Cir. 1974);
United States v. McCoy, 478 F.2d 176, 179 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828 (1973);
United States v. Unger, 469 F.2d 1283, 1287 n.4 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920
(1973); United States v. Walker, 294 A.2d 376, 377-78 (D.C. 1972); United States v. Mahler,
442 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993 (1971); McCreary v. Sigler, 406
F.2d 1264, 1269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 984 (1969); Brown v. State, 534 S.W.2d 213,
216 (Ark. 1976); People v. Glaubman, 175 Colo. 41, 485 P.2d 711, 717 (1971); State v. Paszek,
50 Wis. 2d 619, 629-31, 184 N.W.2d 836, 842-43 (1971).
23. See also United States v. Kemp, 421 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Pa. 1976); United States v.
Swihart, 554 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1977).
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CHANGE OF VENUE BASED ON PREJUDICIAL PRETRIAL PUBLICITY2 4
Many trial lawyers believe pretrial publicity vitally affects the
outcome of trials; there is, however, a minimum of empirical evi-
dence to support their instinct. Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania
Supreme and Superior Courts have recently ruled that venue should
be changed where there has been pervasive pretrial publicity.25
When the court is faced with the question of whether or not to
grant a change of venue in a criminal proceeding, it must consider,
among other factors, the balance between the right to a fair trial and
the freedom of the press. Freedom of thought and discussion and the
public's right to know are essential rights in a democratic society.
The news media, therefore, must be given wide latitude in reporting
material about criminal proceedings. On the other hand, the judi-
cial process cannot allow news accounts to interfere with the admin-
istration of justice. Each defendant in a criminal prosecution is
entitled to a fair trial, conducted solely in the courtroom and free
of outside influence. As noted in Sheppard v. Maxwell, " "legal trials
are not elections to be won through the use of the meeting hall, the
radio, and the newspapers." It is the court which controls the trial,
and the court must insure the fairness of such proceedings. Possibly,
this explains the newly-emerging appellate support for changes of
venue.
Dispositions of motions for change of venue have been held to be
within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Despite the presence
of what might be termed inflammatory and pervasive publicity, the
tendency was to uphold lower court decisions denying changes of
venue.Y
In Commonwealth v. Kichline, 28 for example, the trial court noted
that newspapers were "restrained in their coverage" and their re-
ports were "primarily factual." The defendant was arrested for the
robbery, kidnapping, and murder of a gas station attendant. He
subsequently confessed to police, giving details of the crime. The
confession was supplied to the press by an "unidentified" official,
24. Research assistance was provided by Lou Krzemien.
25. Commonwealth v. Frazier, 471 Pa. 121, 369 A.2d 1224 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Casper, 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 21, 375 A.2d 737 (1977), rev'd, 392 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1978).
26. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
27. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 451 Pa. 190, 303 A.2d 209 (1973); Commonwealth v. Hoss,
445 Pa. 98, 283 A.2d 58 (1971); Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 361 A.2d 282 (1976).
28. 468 Pa. 265, 361 A.2d 282 (1976).
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and at least three news articles used appellant's confession as a
basis to describe his movements during and after the crime. Defen-
dant's criminal record and his prison furlough program were also
referred to in several newspaper articles. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, in upholding the denial of venue change, ruled:
"Although pre-trial publicity of an alleged confession and of prior
criminal offenses is prejudicial to a defendant, we cannot conclude
that, in the circumstances of this case, such publicity was so
'inherently prejudicial' as to deny [the defendant] a fair trial."2
The court was persuaded by the fact that the articles were published
six months before trial and that the publicity had ceased after the
defendant's preliminary arraignment.
More recently, in Commonwealth v. Frazier,3 in a factual situa-
tion similar to Kichline, the court reached a contrary result. Frazier
was convicted of first degree murder in the stabbing death of a
young girl. After appellant's arrest, he gave a partial confession to
police. The confession, appellant's prior criminal record, and the
circumstances surrounding the crime were the subject of repeated
news articles which (in contrast to Kichline) were not confined to
factual accounts but were highly emotional.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a opinion by Justice
Manderino, reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that
there had been references to the defendant's prior criminal record
and quotations of admissions of guilt allegedly made by him to the
police and that news stories of the above facts had reached the
homes of practically every potential juror in the county. In the
court's opinion, the record failed to demonstrate that the effect
created by this publicity had faded from the minds of the prospec-
tive jurors in the four-month period between the time of trial and
the homicide. The court therefore concluded that the potential for
prejudice remained great at the time of the request for change of
venue and that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing the
request.
Similarly, the superior court, in Commonwealth v. Casper,3
noted various factors to be considered by the trial court in consider-
29. Id. at 275, 361 A.2d at 288.
30. 471 Pa. 121, 369 A.2d 1224 (1977).
31. 249 Pa. Super Ct. 21, 375 A.2d 737 (1977), rev'd, 392 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1978). Casper
involved a prominent local political official whose conviction was reversed by the superior
court with directions that venue be changed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the
superior court.
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ing applications for change of venue, any one of which could require
a venue change: 1) the extent of the pretrial publicity; 2) the nature
of the pretrial publicity; 3) the nature of the community which was
subject to the pretrial publicity and where the trial was scheduled
to take place; and 4) the source or sources of the pretrial publicity,
including the possibility of prosecutorial misconduct, in creating an
atmosphere of hostility toward the accused.
These more recent decisions reflect a concession to the practical
difficulties of trying to regulate news coverage. In the past, the
Pennsylvania decisions have reflected a tendency to make the de-
fense run the risk of the prejudice. There now seems to be a more
realistic trend: in cases that have been the subjects of sensational
reporting, trial courts, under the directives from the Pennsylvania
appellate courts, more readily permit removal to another trial loca-
tion. Changes of venue are inconvenient for the prosecution and
defense, but if news reporting is unrestrained and regulation is le-
gally impermissible, the best remedy is to remove the case from the
area that has been inundated by pretrial publicity. In this way the
courts can insure fairness while respecting the public's right to know
of public proceedings.
USE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS FOR IMPEACHMENT OF DEFENDANTS AND
WITNESSES
32
Most trial lawyers believe that successful impeachment of the
defendant or a key witness can often determine the outcome of the
trial; the admission or exclusion of evidence of a prior conviction of
a defendant or witness may be the critical element in the jury's
verdict. Thus, it is appropriate to consider, at least briefly, the
Pennsylvania law on impeachment through the use of a prior crimi-
nal record.
Any witness, including the defendant, may be impeached through
the introduction of only certain types of convictions: crimes involv-
ing dishonesty or false statements.3 3 Once the court decides the
crime falls into one of these two categories, it must then weigh the
32. Research assistance was provided by Michael J. McCaney, Jr.
33. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Kahley, 467 Pa. 272, 356 A.2d 745 (1976). Not all crimes reflect dishonesty or an inclination
towards false statements; for example, crimes of violence such as murder or assault do not
include such mental elements and are excluded.
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prosecution's interest in having the prior convictions presented to
the jury against the possible prejudicial effect to the witness. Among
the factors to be considered by the court are the remoteness of the
prior crime; the length of the witness' criminal record; the age and
circumstances of the witness at the time of his conviction; and,
when it is the defendant that is to be impeached, th extent to which
the defense depends on the defendant's testimony. This two-tiered
approach, gleaned from Commonwealth v. Bighum34 and
Commonwealth v. Kahley,3 is favorably viewed by defense counsel,
since it limits impeachment of a defendant. When the witness to be
impeached is the defendant, the most critical consideration is the
importance of allowing the jury to hear the defendant's story rather
than know of his prior convictions. The trial judge, aware that the
defendant will not take the stand if his prior convictions are to be
admitted, will often exclude the evidence so that the jury can hear
the defendant's story.
It seems that evidence of certain prior convictions is certainly
relevant and appropriate for the jury to consider in determining the
credibility of the witness. A former conviction, being an indicator
of trustworthiness, may be decisive of a witness' credibility. Focus-
ing our discussion only on the issue of relevancy of prior convictions,
we believe that any conviction of a reasonably serious nature has
probative value to the jury and should be admitted. That value is
diminished where the charges result from criminal conduct many
years prior or where the effect of such impeachment may be to
needlessly expose the witness' past, but such considerations arise at
the balancing level of analysis. The object in the first stage is to
determine that the convictions have value for the purpose for which
they are admissible-to determine credibility.
34. 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973).
35. 467 Pa. 272, 356 A.2d 745 (1976). See also Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). The Federal Rules of Evidence have a significantly different approach to permissi-
ble grounds for impeachment through use of prior convictions. Rule 609(a) classifies crimes
that are admissible for impeachment in two categories: felonies without regard to the nature
of the crime and crimes involving dishonesty and false statement without regard to the grade
of the offense. Within the first category, felonies are admissible if the party offering the
convictions can convince the court that knowledge of the crime will aid the jury's evaluation
of the witness more than it will prejudice the defendant. Thus, the rule balances the import-
ance of a witness-prosecution or defense-against the possibility that the jury's knowledge
of that witness' prior criminal record will prejudice the defendant. Crimes of the second
category are not subject to a similar balancing test; they are automatically admissible regard-
less of the potential prejudice to the defendant.
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Pennsylvania has drawn a distinction, difficult to understand,
between crimes which involve dishonesty or false statements (which
are admissible) and those which are serious but do not include men-
tal elements (which are inadmissible), in effect, holding that the
former are relevant to credibility while the latter are not." Starting
with the proposition that the credibility of one who has been con-
victed of a crime involving dishonesty should be questioned, can it
truly be said that one convicted of murder, rape, or aggravated
assault is more worthy of belief?
The value of the Bighum/Kahley rule, if any, is that impeach-
ment of the defendant is limited; but other witnesses are given
similar protection without necessarily having the same need or justi-
fication. Impeachment of a defendant offers unique problems, be-
cause where the defendant is impeached through the use of a prior
conviction, there is a risk that the jury will give that prior conviction
an impact which it does not deserve legally nor logically. The jury
may conclude that the defendant is a bad person who is prone to
commit crime and convict him on that basis. Another shortcoming
of the Bigham/Kahley rule is that it is a balancing test which may
lead to somewhat haphazard results from case to case and judge to
judge.
There is a more rational and consistent approach to impeachment
through evidence of prior convictions. Where the defendant does not
interject his criminal history into a trial, and where a prior criminal
conviction is not an element of the offense and is inadmissible to
show pattern, motive, identity, etc., there would seem to be no loss
of any legitimate prosecution interest if the prior criminal record is
excluded, since the defendant-witness suffers from the general disa-
bility of an interested witness-his testimony is viewed with reason-
able suspicion. The convictions of defendants should be excluded
because introducing a defendant's prior conviction to impeach him
is likely to have an inflammatory effect against him. However, as
to those who are not defendants, but simply witnesses, whether
prosecution or defense, there seems to be no- good reason to bar
impeachment except to protect against a "smearing" effect,37 for
example, when convictions are minor or they have little or no proba-
tive value. Excluding the prior record only in these cases would: 1)
36. See Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 566, 307 A.2d 255, 262 (1973).
37. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Rys., 432 Pa. 123, 247 A.2d 467 (1968).
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recognize the general probative value of former convictions; 2) pro-
tect defendants against the extra-legal effects of former convictions;
3) protect other witnesses, both prosecution and defense, from im-
peachment on the basis of minor incidents or ancient history which
have little or no probative value. Perhaps it is unlikely that there
will be another upheaval in Pennsylvania law in this area, since
Bighum is of recent vintage. An alternative, however, may be to
interpret and apply the balancing test established by Bighum in
such a way as to achieve similar results.
INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER-NECESSITY OF CHARGING IN HOMICIDE
CASES"
For years, our courts have wavered on whether a jury may con-
sider a verdict of manslaughter where the indictment only charges
murder. Although previously an open issue, it has been substan-
tially resolved by recent decisions. Questions, however, remain.
Two distinct situations must be considered in analyzing the
judge's responsibility in instructing the jury when the defendant is
charged with murder only. If the evidence warrants the return of a
manslaughter verdict, must the trial judge charge the jury that they
may return such a verdict? Secondly, the courts have grappled with
the question: is such a charge required where no evidence existed
at the trial to support a manslaughter verdict? A long line of cases,
culminating in Commonwealth v. Jones,31 answered both questions
in the affirmative, as they apply to voluntary manslaughter; Jones
in effect held that the trial judge must charge the jury on voluntary
manslaughter regardless of what the evidence indicates.
The law is not as clear when the focus shifts to involuntary man-
slaughter. In a series of four cases decided on October 7, 1977,40 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, upon request, a jury in-
struction on involuntary manslaughter is required in a homicide
trial where the evidence would support such a verdict, notwith-
standing that involuntary manslaughter was not charged in the in-
dictment. The justices, however, did not agree on whether an invol-
38. Research assistance was provided by Claudia Creo Sharon.
39. 457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974).
40. Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 378 A.2d 1189 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 378 A.2d 1199 (1977); Commonwealth v. Ford, 474 Pa. 480, 378 A.2d 1215
(1977); Commonwealth v. Smith, 474 Pa. 559, 379 A.2d 96 (1977).
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untary manslaughter charge is required where the evidence does not
support this verdict.
A brief analysis of the separate opinions in Commonwealth v.
Polimenill illustrates each justice's position, in all four cases, on the
question. Justice Pomeroy, writing the opinion of the court, joined
by Chief Justice Eagen, thought there was no need to decide the
issue, and expressly declined to do so, since in all four cases,
Commonwealth v. Polimeni, Commonwealth v. Garcia," Com-
monwealth v. Ford,4 3 and Commonwealth v. Smith," there was suf-
ficient evidence to support a verdict of involuntary manslaughter.
Justice Roberts, joined by Justice O'Brien, concurred in the deci-
sion, stating that a jury instruction on involunatry manslaughter
should be given in every criminal homicide trial, since, in his view,
there is always evidence of involuntary manslaughter if there is
sufficient evidence to support a murder conviction. Justice Mander-
ino also filed a concurring opinion, stating that a jury instruction
on involuntary manslaughter should be given in every homicide trial
"whether or not there is any 'rational basis' in the mind of the trial
judge for such a verdict.' '45 He reasoned that it is solely the jury's
prerogative to decide whether the evidence supports a verdict of
involuntary manslaughter. Justice Nix, believing that the jury
should be permitted to return verdicts only on the charges brought
in the indictment, dissented from the decision and never reached
the open question.4
Thus, three justices, Roberts, O'Brien, and Manderino, believe
that an instruction on involuntary manslaughter should be permit-
ted in every criminal homicide prosecution, while two justices,
Eagen and Pomeroy, believe that the instruction should be given at
least where the evidence presented at trial provides a rational basis
for such a verdict. Each justice's position is consistent in all four
cases.
Further analysis of the four cases discloses that five justices,
41. 474 Pa. 430, 378 A.2d 1189 (1977).
42. 474 Pa. 449, 378 A.2d 1199 (1977).
43. 474 Pa. 480, 378 A.2d 1215 (1977).
44. 474 Pa. 559, 379 A.2d 96 (1977).
45. 474 Pa. at 448, 378 A.2d at 1198.
46. Justice Nix dissented in Polimeni for the reasons stated in his dissent in Common-
wealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 471, 378 A.2d 1199, 1210 (1977). He disagrees with the plural-
ity's continued application of the lesser included offense concept.
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Eagen, O'Brien, Pomeroy, Roberts, and Manderino, agreed that
involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of criminal
homicide and that a verdict of involuntary manslaughter is permis-
sible whether or not charged in the indictment. This determination
was based on a first-impression interpretation of the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code's new definition of criminal homicide.47 Justice Rob-
erts, in his concurring opinion in Garcia, examined section 302(e)
of the Crimes Code, which states: "When the law provides that
negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such ele-
ment also is established if the person acts intentionally or know-
ingly." Justice Roberts reasoned that since "an intentional or know-
ing killing also establishes a negligent killing, all criminal homicides
necessarily include involuntary manslaughter as a constitutent of-
fense," adding "[n]either the prosecution's theory of the case, nor
the court's evaluation of the weight or credibility of the evidence,
should deprive the jury of the information necessary to consider
whether involuntary manslaughter has been committed."48
Justice Roberts relied on a deeply-rooted concept in our common
law legal system: the broad powers of the jury to believe or disbe-
lieve what it chooses and to accept evidence and contentions in
whole or in part. Given the conflicting theories and evidence nor-
mally submitted by the prosecution and defense, it seems difficult
to envision a situation where the power of the jury to pick and
choose from the evidence could not lead to a broad range of verdicts.
An analysis of the decisions that culminated in the Pennsylvania
rule-a charge on voluntary manslaughter is required in every crim-
inal homicide prosecution, whether or not the evidence would sup-
port the verdict-indicates that this same rule should be applied to
involuntary manslaughter charges. Before Jones, the jury could re-
turn a verdict of manslaughter; but the trial judge could refuse to
instruct on it if he felt that such a verdict would be irrational. 9
Commonwealth v. Jones eliminated this anomaly in the law.
Prior to Jones, only irrational juries or juries which in effect disre-
garded a judge's charge could render a manslaughter verdict. Now,
47. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2501-2504 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
48. 474 Pa. at 464, 469, 378 A.2d at 1207-08, 1210 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(e)
(Purdon Supp. 1977-1978)).
49. Commonwealth v. Cannon, 453 Pa. 389, 396-97, 309 A.2d 384, 389 (1973); Common-
wealth v. Davis, 449 Pa. 468, 297 A.2d 817 (1972); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Pa. 562,
586-87, 297 A.2d 794, 797 (1972).
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however, all juries are to be appraised of the possibility of a man-
slaughter verdict. Furthermore, in 1974, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held in United States ex ret. Matthews v. Johnsonlo
that it was a violation of due process for a trial judge to refuse to
charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter even though the defen-
dant was only charged with murder and the evidence did not sup-
port a manslaughter verdict. Since the jury's opportunity to return
a verdict of voluntary manslaughter was solely dependent on the
judge's subjective reaction, the court reasoned that the Pennsyl-
vania procedure was unfair and arbitrary. "To deny appellee the
possibility of a lesser restraint of liberty because of a practice which
permits arbitrary trial court activity is offensive to those settled
concepts of due process."51
The constitutional argument could apply to involuntary man-
slaughter cases as well; however, this ultimate question may never
be reached. Given the rationale of the various justices, it appears
that few, if any, cases will provide a factual basis where there is no
evidence of involuntary manslaughter.
CHANGES IN LAW-RETROACTIVITY OR PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION 2
It is clear under the Third Circuit decision in United States ex rel.
Matthews v. Johnson,53 that as a matter of federal constitutional
law, a defendant indicted for murder is entitled, upon request, to
have the jury advised of its power to return a verdict of voluntary
manslaughter, even where the evidence does not provide a basis for
finding passion or legal provocation. Twice, by equally divided
courts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that this change
applies prospectively only, that is, to cases tried after the date of
the Matthews decision. 4
Notwithstanding the sharp divisions in the court, it is doubtful
that the Matthews decision will be applied retroactively; the nature
50. 503 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975).
51. Id. at 345.
52. Research assistance was provided by James Norris.
53. 503 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975). Shortly before the Third
Circuit held that the failure to give the instruction violated due process, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court required that the instruction be given under its supervisory powers in Com-
monwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974).
54. Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Cain, 471 Pa. 140, 369 A.2d 1234 (1977).
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of the decision and the composition of the voting blocs weigh against
reversal. Furthermore, the decision to apply Matthews only pro-
spectively appears to have the sanction of the faderal court which
initiated the change. The purpose of this section is to explore
whether these cases indicate a trend to generally restrict the appli-
cation of changes in criminal procedural law.
In Matthews, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that
its ruling applied to cases in which a jury instruction for voluntary
manslaughter was properly and timely requested and which, if the
trials had been completed, were on direct appeal in the Pennsyl-
vania courts as of the date of decision-August 15, 1974.11 There-
after, the Third Circuit held that its decision in Matthews would not
be applied retroactively and stated that Matthews is inapplicable
to pending, and/or future appeals from pre-Matthews murder ver-
dicts." The obvious change in the Third Circuit stance was influ-
enced by the intervening decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Daniel v. Louisiana,7 concerning Louisiana's method of
petit jury selection. In Daniel, the state procedures were struck
down, but the Supreme Court only applied its decision prospec-
tively; whether Daniel was to be applied retroactively was held by
the Supreme Court to be a state matter. Thus, as a matter of state
law, the Pennsylvania courts were free to apply Matthews retroac-
tively. As noted, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court divided
equally, refusing to give Matthews retroactive effect.
Courts generally look to three factors in deciding whether a deci-
sion is to be given retroactive or prospective application: the pur-
pose to be served by the new standards; the extent of reliance by
law enforcement authorities on the old standards; and the effect on
the administration of justice in the retroactive application of the
new standards. 58 The critical factor is the purpose of the change, and
therefore retroactivity is normally accorded where the constitutional
change implicates the truth-finding process of a trial as compared
with procedural aspects.
Supporting the decision not to give Matthews retroactive effect,
Justice Eagen, in Commonwealth v. Cain,5 9 stated:
55. 503 F.2d at 348-49.
56. United States ex rel. Cannon v. Johnson, 536 F.2d 1013, 1015 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 928 (1976).
57. 420 U.S. 31 (1975).
58. Commonwealth v. Cain, 471 Pa. 140, 369 A.2d 1234 (1977). See also United States v.
Zirpolo, 450 F.2d 424, 431-433 (3d Cir. 1971).
59. 471 Pa. 140, 369 A.2d 1234 (1977).
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since the purpose of Matthews is not to enhance the truth-
finding process, since considerable reliance by the Common-
wealth is present, since a horrendous burden would be placed
on the administration of justice were we to apply Matthews to
cases on direct review, and since the Third Circuit has ruled
Matthews need not be applied to collateral attacks and no
distinction as to cases on direct appeal is justified, it is clear
that federal constitutional considerations do not mandate the
application of Matthews to cases on direct review."
A good argument can be made, however, that Matthews does
involve the truth-finding process. Matthews appears to decide that
the prior rule unduly restricted the mercy-dispensing functions of
the jury because there were no standards for the exercise of the trial
court's discretion to give or withhold a charge on manslaughter. The
jury's mercy dispensing function is closely related to the fact-finding
or truth-finding process. Also, it is questionable whether a
"horrendous burden" would be placed on the administration of jus-
tice if the benefits of the new rule were extended to the defendants
with pending cases who sought retroactive application.
In a more recent case, Commonwealth v. Ernst,6 1 an equally-
divided court denied retroactive enforcement of Commonwealth v.
Rose 2 and Commonwealth v. Demmitt"3 which established that a
defendant did not have the burden of proving an insanity defense
by a fair preponderance of the evidence. In Ernst, the jury was
erroneously charged that the murder defendant had the burden of
proving his insanity. The defendant's trial, however, took place be-
fore the announcement of Rose or Demmitt. Perhaps the justices
who refused to remand for a new trial"4 were primarily influenced
by the defendant's failure to object to the court's charge or to raise
the issue before appeal. Such a rationale would be in accord with
recent decisions. 5 However, certain language of Justice Pomeroy's
opinion reflects a broader doctrine. First, Justice Pomeroy noted
60. Id. at 164, 369 A.2d at 1246.
61. 476 Pa. 102, 381 A.2d 1245 (1977).
62. 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974).
63. 456 Pa. 475, 321 A.2d 627 (1974).
64. Justice Pomeroy filed the opinion in support of affirmance and was joined by Chief
Justice Eagen. Justice Nix concurred in result. Justices Roberts, O'Brien, and Manderino
filed an opinion in support of reversal.
65. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974).
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that. the Demmitt/Rose decisions were founded upon state eviden-
tiary law and that later decisions applying Demmitt/Rose retroac-
tively were probably based on a mistaken notion that federal consti-
tutional requirements were involved. Since several defendants
whose trials took place prior to the announcements of Demmitt and
Rose had received the benefits of these decisions in direct appeals,
and since it would be inequitable to deny retroactivity tb other
similarly-situated defendants whose cases were also on direct ap-
peal, Justice Pomeroy concluded that the defendant would have
been entitled to a new trial if the issue had been properly preserved
for appeal. More significantly, Justice Pomeroy noted: "The almost
uniform practice of this Court has been to apply nonconstitutionally
premised criminal law decisions in a nonretroactive manner.""
Thus, the questions are apparent. Constitutional holdings will or
will not be applied retroactively depending upon various factors but
primarily upon the relationship to the fact-finding process; In non-
constitutional holdings, however, several justices may deny retroac-
tive application in any instance.
If a rule is changed or modified because it is offensive or defective,
it seems unreasonable that all who are similarly-situated should not
receive the benefits of the change, particularly where the prior pre-
cedent has been challenged in the lower court in accordance with
applicable procedures. It seems equally inappropriate that the out-
come of an important case should depend on the ability or luck of a
particular defendant to get his or her case heard first. This has the
appearance of reducing justice to a foot race to the appellate courts
or to a lottery as to which cases can be heard and decided earliest.
Of course, some might applaud the discouragement of ap-
peals-but through the process of appeals to the higher courts, laws
are made, changed, and, presumably, improved. Can it seriously be
argued that discouraging appeals for the sake of expediency is
beneficial? This is a particular risk where the benefits of retroactiv-
ity are denied even to those who go to the effort and often great
expense of raising the issues and having the change of law deter-
mined in their cases.
Much may depend upon whether the courts characterize their
opinions as a "change" in law which justifies retroactive application
or as an application of existing law. Certainly, the distinctions are
66. Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 107, 381 A.2d 1245, 1247 (1977).
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not clear and the differences seem too minute to serve as the base
for important decisions; but, if a trend emerges to restrict retroac-
tivity, such considerations will become critical.
Pennsylvania criminal law is in a stage of dramatic movement.
The state of flux, however, does not justify denying relief to ag-
grieved individuals who specifically challenge the law throughout
all court proceedings, including appeal to the highest court in the
commonwealth. As a general proposition, retroactive application of
new law should not be denied to those on direct appeal.
SENTENCING1
7
Traditionally, Pennsylvania trial judges have had virtually un-
limited discretion within the statutory maximum and minimum to
sentence convicted offenders. Under prevailing practice, judges ex-
amine the defendant's actions and prior record, and then impose a
sentence, with or without the aid of a presentence report. Until
recently, judges were neither required to justify the sentences they
imposed nor record the reasons for their decision. Sentences have
seldombeen subject to review if they were within the maximum
limits provided by law.
Unfettered discretion in sentencing has been criticized by the
legal profession, Given the safeguards surrounding the determina-
tion of guilt or innocence-rules of evidence, procedure, effective
appellate review-it seems incongruous that the sentencing process
should be so unstructrued.
There are indications from a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision, however, that more objective standards are about to be
imposed on the sentencing process. In Commonwealth v. Riggins,6
the accused was arrested with 1.9 ounces of marijuana and found
guilty of possession with intent to deliver. The trial judge sentenced
Riggins for a term of two to five years in prison without stating or
recording any reasons for the sentence. Riggins appealed to the su-
perior court, contending that his sentence was severe when com-
pared with two others convicted of similar drug offenses. He also
asked that the case be remanded so that the trial judge could ex-
plain his reasoning for the sentence. The actions of the trial judge
67. Research assistance was provided by Thomas Santone.
68. 474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140 (1977).
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were affirmed by the superior court." On appeal to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, the case was remanded, and the trial judge was
ordered to record the reasons for the sentence he imposed."
Possible Benefits of Requiring Stated Reasons for Sentences
The Riggins requirement of stated reasons for sentencing should
improve the sentencing process. When sentencing, a judge can eas-
ily be swayed by irrelevant considerations, such as personal preju-
dice, causing him to impose more severe sentences than are war-
ranted by the facts of the case.71 A reasoned opinion by the trial
judge will promote more thoughtful consideration of factors relevant
to sentencing, as set out in the Sentencing Code.72 Recorded reasons
may develop meaningful sentencing criteria, such as aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, for future decisions, and sentencing
may become more uniform.
The requirement of a reason and statement by the trial judge will
also encourage him to verify the information he relies on in presen-
tence reports. In Pennsylvania, the sentencing judge has discretion
to order a presentence report in any case. If incarceration of one year
or more is possible under the applicable sentencing statute, the
judge must order the report or record his reasons for dispensing with
it. The report includes information regarding circumstances of the
offense and the defendant's character sufficient to aid the court in
determining sentence.73 A sentence based on an inaccurate report
could send the offender to jail for an unduly long period. For exam-
ple, in State v. Pohlabel,71 the defendant was sentenced to twenty-
one to thirty-five years on the basis of an inaccurate presentence
report. Since the reasons for the sentence were not recorded, the
69. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 32, 332 A.2d 521 (1974), rev'd and
remanded, 474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140 (1977).
70. In a separate opinion, Justice Manderino expressed his opinion that the defendant
should be discharged because the sentence was already unduly severe. 474 Pa. at 139, 377
A.2d at 152.
71. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kosta, 475 Pa. 85, 379 A.2d 884 (1977).
72. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 129, 377 A.2d 140,147 (1977). See also Wyzan-
ski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HIv. L. Rzv. 1281, 1292 (1952).
73. PA. R. Cam. P. 1403. See Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 129, 377 A.2d 140,
147 (1977). See also Berkowitz, The Consititutional Requirement for a Written Statement of
Reasons and Facts in Support of the Sentencing Decision: A Due Plocess Proposal, 60 IowA
L. Rzv. 205 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Requirement].
74. 61 N.J. Super Ct. 242, 160 A.2d 647 (1960).
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defendant remained in jail for ten years before the parole board
discovered that the sentence was unjust. If the judge verifies the
information on which he bases the sentence he can insure that the
sentence he imposes is just.
Commentators, as well as judges, believe that the criminal justice
system is more successful at rehabilitating offenders when criminals
understand the reasons for their confinement.7 5 If a sentenced of-
fender does not resent the system, but understands that his trial was
fair and that his sentence is intended to rehabilitate him, there is a
better chance for success.
It seems apparent, however, that Riggins signals something more;
stated reasons would not be required if the supreme court did not
intend to examine those reasons. It thus appears that more exten-
sive review of the reasonableness of sentences is close at hand.
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code established sentencing alterna-
tives and a priority system: 1) probation, 2) determination of guilt
without penalties, 3) partial confinement, 4) total confinement, or
5) fine. The sentence chosen should call for a minimum amount of
confinement consistent with the protection of public, the gravity of
offense, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." As a minimum,
sentencing judges should be required to specify why a particular
sentencing alternative was selected and why the court concluded
that the chosen alternative was the minimum required for the stat-
ute's purposes. In other words, through the process of appellate
review, added meaning will be given to the statutory priorities.
APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN PROBATION AND PAROLE
REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS
77
Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v.
Kate 71 that the Miranda exclusionary rule does not apply to a pro-
bation revocation hearing, this does not appear to be an open ques-
tion. The court in Kates reasoned that the deterrent purpose of the
Miranda exclusionary rule is adequately served by exclusion of the
unlawfully seized evidence at the time of trial and no further benefi-
cial effect would be achieved by exclusion at revocation proceedings.
75. See Constitutional Requirement, supra note 73, at 208.
76. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1321 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
77. Research assistance provided by Jeffrey Sagotaky.
78. 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973).
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Federal courts have thus far agreed that the Constitution does not
require Miranda to be extended to probation revocation hearings. 9
In Kates, however, there were two vigorous dissents. Justice Rob-
erts, in dissent, reasoned that the exclusionary rule should apply to
probation revocation hearings, since, in practice, the revocation pro-
ceeding is used frequently as an alternative to prosecution for the
underlying offense: "'[T]he fact that an independent prosecution
and revocation under an old conviction are often interchangeable for
a probationer suggests that abrogation of the exclusionary rule for
probation revocation proceedings would seriously undermine the
rule's effect as a deterrent.' " This potential use of probation revo-
cation is exemplified by two recent federal decisions: United States
v. Winsett8' and United States v. Vandemark.2 In Vandemark, the
defendant moved to suppress unlawfully seized evidence prior to
trial, but before the motion could be heard, the government volun-
tarily dismissed the case. Soon thereafter, the defendant's probation
officer moved to revoke probation. In Winsett, the situation was
much the same. The information against the defendant was dis-
missed and the revocation proceedings initiated when the trial judge
ruled that the evidence against the defendant was unlawfully seized
and thus inadmissable.
In Winsett, the court, in permitting the illegally seized evidence
to be used at the revocation proceeding, placed great reliance on the
79. United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Vandemark,
522 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1975).
80. 452 Pa. at 123, 305 A.2d at 712 (citing United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 820 (7th
Cir. 1971) (Fairchild, J., dissenting)). In Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399 (Okla. 1973), the
court held that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search could not be used in the
revocation of the defendant's suspended sentence. The holding was based on a state statute
which provided that the suspended sentence of the defendant may not be revoked for any
cause unless competent evidence is presented to the court. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
991b (West Supp. 1978-1979). Since the court had previously ruled that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence was not competent, the Michaud court excluded the evidence. The court
concluded that the exclusionary rule was a constitutional right rather than a mere rule of
procedure. Furthermore, the court held that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
unlawful police conduct; if the evidence from unlawful conduct was admissible at revocation
proceedings, it would provide an incentive to disregard the constitutional rule.
Most federal and state courts have refused to follow the example of the Oklahoma court.
See Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1974); In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 463 P.2d
734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1970); People v. Calais, 37 Cal. App. 3d 898, 112 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1974).
In the many revocation cases denying the application of the exclusionary rule, no clear-cut
rule has been voiced.
81. 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975).
82. 522 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1975).
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fact that the arresting officers, border patrol agents, were unaware
at the time of the search that the defendant was a probationer. In a
footnote to the case, the court commented:
[Wihen the police at the moment of search know that a sus-
pect is a probationer, they may have a significant incentive to
carry out an illegal search even though knowing that evidence
would be inadmissible in any criminal proceeding. The police
have nothing to risk: If the motion to suppress in the criminal
proceedings were denied, defendant would stand convicted of
a new crime; and if the motion were granted, the defendant
would still find himself behind bars due to revocation of proba-
tion. Thus, in such circumstances, extension of the exclusion-
ary rule to the probation revocation proceeding may be neces-
sary to effectuate Fourth Amendment safeguardsu
Similarly, other states have indicated that the exclusionary role
might have at least limited application in revocation proceedings.
In People v. Atencio, 4 while the Supreme Court of Colorado refused
to exclude evidence in a revocation proceeding, the court stated that
where the unlawful search and seizure is "such as to shock the
conscience of the court, the court will not permit such conduct to
be the basis of a state-imposed sanction.""
In State v. Sears,"s the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed a deci-
sion to exclude illegally seized evidence from a revocation proceed-
ing on the grounds that probation or parole revocation hearings are
not part of the normal criminal process and, thus, did not have to
conform to the rules of criminal procedure. The court balanced the
needs of the probation system against the possible deterrence result-
ing from suppression in revocation proceedings, and concluded that
any benefits which would flow from the application of the exclusion-
ary rule would be outweighed by the needs of Alaska's probation
system. However, the court held that the exclusionary rule would
83. 518 F.2d 51, 54 n.5 (9thCir. 1975).
84. 186 Colo. 76, 525 P.2d 461 (1974).
85. Id. at 79, 525 P.2d at 463.
86. 553 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1976). In Sears, the respondent was placed on probation after
pleading guilty to a charge of accessory after the fact to burglary. While still on probation,
respondent was indicted for possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. During the
trial for the narcotics violation, the court suppressed the evidence as being the product of an
illegal search. At the subsequent probation revocation hearing, the court stated that the
decision of the trial court was binding in the revocation proceeding.
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be applied in two circumstances: first, if the police misconduct
shocked the conscience of the court,87 and second, if the lawless
search and seizure was carried out with knowledge or reason to
believe that the suspect was a probationer.
It is clear that as a matter of federal constitutional law, revocation
proceedings do not require the full scope of rights due a defendant
in a criminal proceeding.Y Furthermore, the present United States
Supreme Court seems bent on limiting Miranda specifically and the
exclusionary rule generally. 9 Some legal scholars believe that the
rule may be on its way to oblivion. In the light of this unmistakable
trend, it seems foolhardy to envision any contrary movement.
However, the state courts are free to go and often do go beyond
the minimum limits of federal constitutional protections.0 Since
Pennsylvania has increasingly demonstrated an inclination to grant
protections beyond those required by the Federal Constitution, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court may abandon its Kates holding.
Given the potential for abuse that exists where the prosecutor can
elect to proceed in criminal court, where the constitutional protec-
tions apply, or in the probation/parole revocation proceedings,
where they do not apply, some protections seem mandated. Even if
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is unwilling to turn away from the
Kates holding, there is room for modification, as for example, where
the arresting officers knew or should have known of the defendant's
status as a parolee or probationer, or where the tactics of the officers
are particularly offensive.
THE SCOPE OF THE BRADY RULE9'
Introduction
In Brady v. Maryland,92 the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced what has become known as the Brady rule: suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused and requested
87. See generally Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (police conduct shocked consci-
ence of court).
88. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971).
90. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Campana,
452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973).
91. Research assistance provided by Henry C. Berns.
92. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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by the accused violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment. Brady v. Maryland was a pro-
nouncement of the minimum due process requirements under the
United States Constitution. The Pennsylvania courts, however, are
free to adopt broader rules as a matter of Pennsylvania constitu-
tional or evidentiary law. Thus far the scope of the Brady rule in
Pennsylvania has remained an open question, with Commonwealth
v. Royster 3 being the most recent definitive case on the issue. In
Royster, defense counsel subpoenaed a police investigation file at
the conclusion of the prosecution's case. The prosecuting attorney
represented to the trial court that he had disclosed all Brady excul-
patory material to the defense. Over two dissents, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that there was no error in the trial court's
failure to order production of the file or to make an in camera
inspection.
This section will first track the development of the Brady rule in
the federal courts and then follow the rule in progress in Pennsyl-
vania courts.
The Development of the Brady Rule in Federal Courts
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Brady, built upon
earlier decisions dealing with the use of false evidence by the prose-
cution. For example, Mooney v. Holohan94 held that due process is
offended when the prosecution knowingly uses false evidence to ob-
tain a conviction. In Napue v. Illinois,95 this view was extended to
cover the situation where the false evidence was unsolicited by the
prosecution, but not contradicted by the prosecution when entered.
Both cases addressed situations where the prosecution manifested
bad faith.
Brady, however, did not involve bad faith on the part of the
prosecution; the prosecution simply withheld an extrajudicial excul-
patory statement made by a co-defendant. The statement con-
firmed the defendant's contention that he had not personally com-
mitted the murder and, arguably, had significant bearing on the
penalty. In eliminating the good faith/bad faith dichotomy, the
Supreme Court focused on materiality of the undisclosed evidence
93. 472 Pa. 581, 372 A.2d 1194 (1977).
94. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
95. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
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and whether any requests had been made by the defense. Because
in Brady the suppressed evidence related only to the question of
sentence as opposed to guilt, the case was remanded for a new trial
only on the issue of sentence."
Giles v. Maryland,7 the first test of the Brady rule, proved to be
inconclusive. The Maryland Court of Appeals refused to grant the
defendants a new trial where the prosecution had suppressed favora-
ble evidence. Notwithstanding their sharply differing views on the
scope of the Brady rule, five Justices of the United States Supreme
Court combined to remand the case to the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals. There was, however, no majority for the pro-Brady rule. Four
Justices remanded on the basis of the alleged bad faith of the prose-
cution, while Justice Fortas, in a concurring opinion, took the posi-
tion that the prosecution must disclose all information known to it
which may have an important effect on the outcome of the proceed-
ings. Justice Harlan, joined in dissent by three other Justices, sug-
gested that Brady extended Mooney and Napue only to the extent
that the evidence may have had an effect on the outcome of the
trial.
Moore v. Illinois1s was another 5-4 decision in which the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the withheld evidence was not
material to guilt.9' Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun
noted that the elements requiring application of the Brady rule are:
1) suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense, 2)
the evidence's favorable character for the defense, and 3) the mate-
riality of the evidence. Justice Blackmun noted that the prosecution
is not required to account to the defense for all police investigatory
work on a case after a general request for all written statements."
United States v. Agurs'00 is the most instructive of the post-Brady
cases. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, delineated three
different situations where the Brady rule was applicable. First is the
96. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan argued that if a statement was not admissi-
ble under state law on the issue of guilt, it was immaterial as to sentencing. 373 U.S. at 92-
95.
97. 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
98. 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
99. The precendential value of this holding is diminished, since the Justices interpreted
the facts of the case so differently. In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the state must
disclose evidence which is clearly relevant and helpful to the defense. This would include
evidence in the police file because the police are part of the prosecutorial team.
100. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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Mooney situation, where the prosecution knows or should have
known about the use of perjured testimony. In these situations,
materiality is only a minimal consideration, not only because of the
prosecutorial misconduct but because of the corruption of the truth-
seeking function. The test of materiality is whether there is any
"reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected
the judgment of the jury." Thus, in this situation, materiality can
almost be presumed.
The second situation occurs where defense counsel asks for spe-
cific evidence prior to trial. Where such request is "specific and
relevant," according to Justice Stevens, the failure by the prosecu-
tor to make any response is seldom if ever excusable.
Although there is, of course, no duty to provide defense counsel
with unlimited disclosure of every thing known by the prosecu-
tor, if the subject matter of such a request is material, or indeed
if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists, it is rea-
sonable to require the prosecutor to respond either by furnish-
ing the information or by submitting the problem to the trial
judge.'0 '
The third situation exists most commonly where defense counsel
is unaware of the existence of exculpatory evidence in the possession
of the prosecution, and a request is made for all Brady or exculpa-
tory material, or no request is made at all. The Agurs Court sug-
gested that there is no valid basis upon which to distinguish the "no
request" from the "general request" situation, in that the same
standards should be applied in either case. In this situation the
materiality test demands that the undisclosed evidence be sufficient
to create a reasonable doubt of guilt that did not otherwise exist.10 1
In his dissent in Agurs, Justice Marshall argued for a less burden-
some definition of materiality in a category three situation. For
Justice Marshall, it would be sufficient if the defendant demon-
strated a significant chance that the withheld evidence, developed
by skilled counsel, would have induced reasonable doubt in the
minds of enough jurors to avoid conviction. 103
101. Id. at 104.
102. Id. at 112.
103. Id. at 119.
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The Pennsylvania Cases
A review of the Pennsylvania cases indicates that while the Brady
rule has been implemented, the Pennsylvania appellate courts have
not been quick to reverse convictions for violations of Brady, nor
have the factual issues provided much opportunity for elaborating
upon the Brady rule. In Lewis v. Lebanon Court of Common
Pleas,04 one of the first cases presenting a Brady problem in Penn-
sylvania, an FBI agent had been listed as a prosecution witness. The
efforts of the defense to interview the witness had been thwarted by
an FBI policy prohibiting such interviews without the consent of the
local district attorney, and consent was withheld. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the prosecutor must not interfere in the
pretrial interrogation. Brady and Giles were cited in support.
In Commonwealth v. Powell 0 5 and in Commonwealth v.
O'Searo, 01 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed and applied
the guidelines for a meritorious Brady contention, as established by
the United States Supreme Court in Moore. '01 In O'Searo, for exam-
ple, the court refused to grant a new trial finding that the withheld
evidence was not material.
In Commonwealth v. Gee, 0 3 the court held that truly
"exculpatory evidence" as contrasted with merely "favorable evi-
dence" must be turned over to the defense even absent specific
request.0 9 The court then differentiated between evidence which
tends to establish innocence from that which is collateral or im-
peaching.
104. 436 Pa. 296, 260 A.2d 184 (1969).
105. 449 Pa. 126, 295 A.2d 295 (1972).
106. 466 Pa. 224, 352 A.2d 30 (1976).
107. In Powell, the defendant contended that an eyewitness had been instructed to
"forget" that she told the district attorney the defendant was not the person she observed
fleeing the scene of the crime. After an evidentiary hearing it was determined that the
defendant's contention was false. The court adopted the guidelines established by the United
States Supreme Court in Moore. 449 Pa. at 129, 295 A.2d at 297. Also of interest is the court's
cognizance of a recently released draft of ABA standards relative to the prosecutorial func-
tion. It specifically quotes § 311(a): "It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to fail to
disclose to the defense at the earliest opportunity evidence which would tend to negate the
guilt of the accused or mitigate the degree of the offense or reduce the punishment." Id. at
129, 295 A.2d at 297 (citing ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CwMNAL JusncE, The Prosecu-
torial Function, §§ 3.11, 5.6(a) (Approved Draft 1971)).
108. 467 Pa. 123, 354 A.2d 875 (1976).
109. Gee also appears to recognize that Brady is applicable whether the request for evi-
dence is made during or before trial.
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Two aspects of the Gee decision deserve special mention. First,
the standard-the evidence must have a "tendency" to establish
innocence-is broader and more favorable to the defendant than the
Agurs test. Second, the distinction between substantive evidence
establishing innocence and collateral or impeaching evidence does
not appear to be well-founded. Often, cases may hinge upon issues
of credibility. Giles and Moore involved various items of evidence,
including credibility items; there does not appear to be any distinc-
tion drawn. Moreover, category one cases-dealing with intentional
or negligent use of perjured testimony-often deal with credibility
items. , ,0
In Commonwealth v. Topa,' only Justice Roberts, dissenting,
dealt with the Brady issues. The majority reversed the conviction
on the ground that voiceprint evidencce was inadmissible. Justice
Roberts would have disposed of the case On the ground that the
prosecution deliberately suppressed evidence. He suggested that
even if suppressed evidence did not meet the test of materiality
under Agurs, the state courts were free to accord broader rights than
those mandated by the Federal Constitution.
Another line of cases has established the defendant's right, upon
request, to pretrial statements of prosecution witnesses after the
witnesses have testified for the prosecution. Commonwealth v.
Grayson"2 is one of the more recent and significant cases dealing
with this issue. In Grayson, the court stated: "Matters contained in
a witness's statement may appear innocuous to -some, but have
great significance to counsel viewing the statements from the
perspective of an advocate for the accused about to cross-examine
a witness." In Commonwealth v. Grimm,"3 it was determined that
a request for all pretrial statements extends to reports made by
police officers who testify. In Commonwealth v. Hamm,"' the court
held that upon request at trial, the defense is entitled to examine
prior statements by prosecution witnesses in their entirety, even
though such statements may not relate to matters raised on direct
examination. The court specifically stated that in camera review
would not adequately insure the ability of the defense to cross-
examine.
110. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
111. 471 Pa. 223, 369 A.2d 1277 (1977).
112. 446 Pa. 427, 353 A.2d 428 (1976).
113. 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 441, 378 A.2d 377 (1977).
114. 474 Pa. 487, 378 A.2d 1219 (1977).
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It should be noted that the cases dealing with prior statements of
prosecution witnesses have several characteristics relevant to the
Brady discussion: 1) the right to access is triggered by a defense
request; 2) a request for the pretrial statements of a witness is a
specific, narrow request which the prosecution should have little or
no difficulty recognizing; 3) although such requests can deal with
substantive grounds, the courts recognize that the primary utility
of former statements is in connection with credibility; 4) the courts
recognize that the defense attorney understands the defense best
and in camera inspection by the court is a poor substitute for inspec-
tion by defense counsel."'
Guidelines for Future Development
A discussion of future developments of the Brady rule in Pennsyl-
vania returns us to Royster. Justice O'Brien, writing for the major-
ity, relied on Agurs and rule 310 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure to determine that defense counsel did not have the
right to examine the police investigation file. Justice Nix concurred
because there was no showing of exculpatory evidence. Justice Rob-
erts, dissenting, argued that, at the very least, the trial court should
have made an in camera inspection. Also dissenting, Justice Man-
derino noted that under the Grayson and Hamm rulings, the de-
fense was entitled to receive all statements of prosecution wit-
nesses."
e
The three category analysis of Agurs provides a suitable frame-
work for analyzing Royster. It was not a category one case in that
the prosecution did not capitalize on perjured testimony. Moreover,
it is unlikely that the Pennsylvania courts will have significant diffi-
culty in recognizing and dealing with such cases. Distinguishing
category two cases from category three cases, however, is more diffi-
cult. One problem in Royster was determining whether the case fell
into category two-specific request-or category three-no request
or only a general request. It appears that a request for the police
investigation file, without any additional showing of relevance or
115. See Commonwealth v. Hamm, 474 Pa. 487, 378 A.2d 1219 (1977). See also Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182 (1969).
116. Of course, if statements were demanded and not produced at the time of testimony,
this was error. Commonwealth v. Grayson, 466 Pa. 427, 353 A.2d 428 (1976); Commonwealth
v. Hamm, 474 Pa. 487, 378 A.2d 1219 (1977).
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materiality, was correctly identified by the court as a general re-
quest falling under category three. The more critical issue facing the
Pennsylvania courts is establishing the materiality requirements for
category three cases as contrasted with category two cases. Under
Agurs, in category three cases, after trial, the defense has a difficult
burden of proving materiality; the burden is perhaps not as high
under state law as the Agurs majority imposed as a matter of federal
law, but even under Justice Marshall's dissenting view, a substan-
tial obstacle would have to be hurdled.
There does not appear to be judicial support for unfettered access
to prosecution files by the defense; unbounded access places people
who have provided information to the authorities in danger of undue
embarrassment or harm. On the other hand, information which is
important to the defense should not be suppressed or withheld.
When a public agency such as the police has developed witnesses
or evidence critical to the defense, it is difficult to understand any
rationale which would regard such witnesses or evidence as the
property of the prosecution. Once evidence is developed and the
defense has made a focused request for such evidence, only tradition
dictates that the evidence not be shared.
Another consideration is the hampering effect on the administra-
tion of justice, the loss of finality of judicial proceedings, if convic-
tions could be easily overturned on the basis of hindsight and post-
trial ingenutiy. After a trial, it may be all too easy to speculate on
what was or might have been important. It is expecting a great deal
of prosecutors and even judges to anticipate and respond to defense
needs, particularly where their attention has not been focused on
such needs either with the assistance of a specific defense request
or the obvious exculpatory nature of the evidence.
A serious obstacle to finality in judicial proceedings would indeed
be created if unrealistic burdens are established. Part of the burden
should fall on defense counsel who, after all, is most aware of the
nature of defense. Also, the absence of a specific defense request
before or during trial may indicate that the evidence lacked sub-
stantial value and its apparent value has been increased through
post-trial ingenuity.
Of course, these burdens must be construed in their proper con-
texts. Just as the law should not place unrealistic demands on prose-
cutors, unrealistic demands should not be placed on defense coun-
sel. Defense counsel is in a poor position to ask for the unknown.
Thus, in all instances, it seems fair to inquire whether the prosecu-
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tor realized or should have realized the importance of the evidence
and made disclosures, and it also seems fair to inquire whether the
defense did or should have made a specific request for disclosure.
Analysis of Category Two Cases
Through this analysis, category two cases are not difficult to re-
solve. Where the attention of a prosecuting attorney and/or the
court have been focused on specific evidence by a defense request,
placing the burden on the prosecution is entirely realistic. Either the
prosecution has the evidence or it does not. If it does, the evidence
should be produced, preferably to the defense, and at least to the
court for examination. 117
By way of analogy, the cases dealing with the statements of prose-
cution witnesses provide some guidance. Where there has been a
focused request for Brady material before or during trial, doubts
should be resolved in favor of production. Failure to produce in
response to a focused request should be judged by the same stan-
dards used to determine whether there has been error in failing to
provide the statements of prosecution witnesses; error should be
reversible unless harmless.
Analysis of Category Three Cases
In Agurs, the majority noted that the constitutional obligation to
produce evidence in category three cases is not measured by the
moral culpability or the willfulness of the prosecutor. "If the sup-
pression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of
the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor."" 8
While this analysis may be appropriate for federal constitutional
purposes, it seems incomplete for purposes of state evidentiary law.
There is agreement that the defendant's burden of proof of mate-
riality should be higher where there has been no request or simply
a general request. The interests in finality require as much. How-
ever, a test which requires the defense to demonstrate reasonable
117. It should be noted that court inspections have some value; certainly, they are better
than nothing. But court inspections are not a satisfactory substitute for disclosure to the
defense attorney who is better attuned to what is important to his case than is the court. See
Commonwealth v. Hamm, 474 Pa. 487, 378 A.2d 1219 (1977); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969).
118. 427 U.S. at 110.
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doubt before the prosecutor has a duty of voluntary disclosure per-
mits suppression of a substantial range of important evidence. Ear-
lier, we discussed the risk that, after trial, evidence could be up-
graded in terms of materiality through hindsight and speculation.
There is also the risk that crucial evidence, through hindsight and
speculation, can be rationalized from "exculpatory evidence" to
"merely favorable." The margins can be very then, and it is submit-
ted that the conduct of the prosecutor is a proper, helpful, and even
essential point of analysis.
In categories one and two, there is some focus on the conduct of
the prosecutor. In category one, materiality is strictly defined to
require reversal in most instances because the prosecutor has know-
ingly used perjured testimony. In category two, it was suggested
that only a minimal showing of materiality is important because the
prosecutor unreasonably failed to respond to a specific request. In
both categories, there is inquiry as to the prosecutor's conduct. It is
only in category three that no form of inquiry has yet been deemed
appropriate.
Should the law permit the prosecution to affirmatively and inten-
tionally conceal or suppress evidence which is important to the de-
fense but which does not in itself establish reasonable doubt?
Should the law permit the prosecution to ignore evidence of obvious
importance to the defense? A line of similar questions can be devel-
oped. It seems clear that at some point the conduct of the prosecutor
is an issue in category three cases just as it is in categories one and
two.
Thus, category three cases should fall into two sub-classes: 1)
those in which the prosecutor has acted in bad faith or negligently
in failing to disclose important evidence; and 2) those in which there
is no showing of bad faith or negligence. In the former, the harmless
error test should control just as it should control in category two. In
the latter, the "significant chance" test of Justice Marshall's dissent
in Agurs, strikes the best balance.
There is merit in distinguishing category three cases where there
has been a general request for disclosure. Depending on the circum-
stances, perhaps the trial court should be expected to do more than
was done in Royster. It may be too broad to ask the court to look
through the file for material favorable to the defense; however, a
narrow, somewhat more specific request should have required the
court to make such an examination.
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